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Abstract
Although homeownership rates currently stand at historically high levels for all segments
of the U.S. population, large gaps in homeownership rates remain when comparing
various groups of the population. As of the third quarter of 2006, the non-Hispanic
White (hereafter, White) homeownership rate was 76 percent while African-American
and Hispanic homeownership rates were below 50 percent and the Asian homeownership
rate was 60 percent. The homeownership gap between African-American and White
households was larger in 2006 than it was in 1990, while the homeownership gap
between Hispanics and Whites was only slightly smaller in 2006 than it was in 1990.
Households with very low incomes had a homeownership rate that was 37 percentage
points below the rate for high-income households. These gaps have changed little over
the past 50 years. The primary goal of this study is to synthesize what is known about
the determinants of gaps in homeownership rates by income status and racial and
ethnic status. We first present a conceptual framework for analyzing the determinants
of homeownership. We then review the literature that identifies the relative importance
of various contributing factors to observed homeownership gaps, separating the factors
into those that are observed and those that are part of an unexplained residual that
represents unmeasured factors such as discrimination, lack of information about the
homebuying and mortgage financing processes, and omitted socioeconomic variables.
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Introduction
The primary goal of this study is to synthesize what is known about the determinants of gaps in
homeownership rates by income status and racial and ethnic status. Our focus is on comparing
non-Hispanic White (hereafter, White) homeownership rates with those of African Americans,
Hispanics, and Asians. We first present a conceptual framework for analyzing the determinants
of homeownership. This framework is used to identify which factors contribute to observed
homeownership differentials. We then review the literature that identifies the relative importance
of various contributing factors to overall observed homeownership gaps.1 Homeownership gaps
are separated into two components: one is the share of the gap that is explained by observed differences in socioeconomic variables among income groups and racial and ethnic groups and the other
is an unexplained residual that represents unmeasured factors that include discrimination, lack of
information about the homebuying and mortgage financing processes, and omitted socioeconomic
variables. We report the consensus opinion about the size of each component and identify areas in
need of further study.

Conceptual Framework of the Determinants of Homeownership Gaps
What explains the differences in homeownership rates among households? Exhibit 1 describes our
framework. We begin with a discussion of the role of household formation, an often-overlooked
factor in the discussion of gaps in homeownership rates. Next, the propensity for homeownership
is separated into demand and supply factors. Under the category of demand factors, we discuss the
user cost approach and the consumption-investment model of households’ choice of whether to
Exhibit 1
Conceptual Framework
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own or rent. Regarding the supply side, both the location of single-family dwellings and mortgage
market constraints may affect homeownership rates.

Household Formation
Although often overlooked, differences in the propensity to form a household could contribute
to gaps in homeownership rates. Factors contributing to differences in household headship rates
include differences in marriage, divorce, and widowhood rates; differences in the typical age that a
youth leaves the parental home; and differences in tendencies to reside in group quarters such as
college dormitories and prisons. Our review of the literature finds that substantial changes in these
factors have occurred during the past 30 years and substantial differences in headship rates are
present when comparing income groups and racial and ethnic groups. We conclude that household
formation is potentially very important to the explanation of why gaps in homeownership are present
and how these gaps have changed, but the existing literature that measures the impact is sparse.
We begin with some definitions. A housing unit is counted as owner occupied if the owner lives in
the dwelling unit. If the owner is absent and the unit is occupied, then the unit is counted as renter
occupied.2 By definition, the number of households equals the total number of occupied housing
units. A household includes all individuals living in a housing unit. Thus, a household may consist
of an individual, a family, a group of unrelated individuals, multiple families, or mixtures of
families and individuals living in the same housing unit. A housing unit is separate living quarters
with direct access to the outside through common halls. Residents excluded from the count of
households include institutionalized individuals in group quarters such as nursing homes, prisons,
and mental hospitals and noninstitutionalized individuals in group quarters such as dormitories,
military quarters, and religious quarters. Thus, individuals living in census-defined group quarters
are excluded from the count of households.
Under these definitions, comparisons of homeownership rates among racial and ethnic groups
and changes in homeownership rates must be interpreted with care. For example, an increase
in the homeownership rate occurs if the number of owners remains constant but the number of
households shrinks. The number of households shrinks if two individuals living apart marry and
live in a single dwelling or if two individuals living apart double up and share a single dwelling
unit. If both households were renting before the move, this change boosts the homeownership rate
even if the new couple lives in a rental unit. If the couple chooses to own, the homeownership rate
is further increased. Differences in the rate of homeownership among various income, racial, and
ethnic groups could be explained, in part, by differences in the amount of doubling up, marriage,
divorce or separation, and living with parents or other relatives or by the share of the population
living in group quarters.
Theoretical insights about household formation are derived from both economic and sociological
perspectives. Garasky, Haurin, and Haurin (2001) argue that African Americans and Hispanics
face discrimination in the housing market, limiting their choice of dwellings. Compared to White
youths, who do not face such discrimination, this limitation may delay minority youth homeleaving and increase the likelihood that minority youths live in groups after leaving their parents’
homes. Haurin, Hendershott, and Kim (1993) argue that the cost of independent living is an
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important determinant of whether a youth leaves the parental home, where this cost is measured
by the cost of both renting and home purchase in the locality. Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and
Ermisch (1999) show that, given empirically reasonable assumptions about the price elasticity
of demand for housing, higher housing costs will lead youths to remain longer in their parents’
homes. Haurin, Hendershott, and Kim (1993) argue that the likelihood of a youth forming a
household depends upon the youth’s ability to earn income as measured by his or her wage or
income.3 Garasky, Haurin, and Haurin (2001) extend this model to examine grouping up versus
living alone. They argue that the greater a youth’s income is and the lower housing prices are,
the higher the proportion of youths who will choose to live alone. These arguments suggest that
youths with low-earnings ability and youths living in high-housing-cost localities will tend to
remain longer in their parents’ home, and, when they exit the parental home, will be more likely to
live in groups. Both factors tend to reduce the headship rate for low-income and minority youths,
where the headship rate is defined as the ratio of household heads to the total population.4
Another factor driving differences in headship rates are differences over time or among groups in
the rates of marriage, partnering (defined as unmarried couples living together), and remarriage.
Divorce, for example, creates two households from one, unless one of the individuals decides to
live with an existing household (for example, relatives, friends, or another partner). Marriage, in
contrast, merges two households into a single unit.
As alluded to earlier, a related factor concerns the definition of which individuals are included in
the count of households. Individuals living in census-designated “group living arrangements” are
excluded from the count of households and thus from the calculation of the homeownership rate.
If individuals move from living alone to a college dorm, military housing, or prison, the count of
households falls. Because young adults are most likely to be drawn from the renter population,
such movements generally will cause homeownership rates to increase. Racial differentials in the
rates of living in group arrangements could affect homeownership gaps.5
Hendershott (1987) studied the impact of household formation on the homeownership rate in
the 1960–85 period. He reported that headship rates increased for all age categories during this
time period. Also, substantial changes occurred in the age distribution due to the baby boom and
subsequent baby bust that impacted the overall U.S. headship rate. Hendershott found that the
impact of these changes in headship on the homeownership rate was potentially fairly large relative to the magnitude of changes in overall homeownership rates. If the age distribution and the
homeownership rates of specific household types had remained constant from 1960 to 1985, the
homeownership rate would have fallen by 5.3 percentage points from 62.3 to 57.0 percent. Instead, the observed homeownership rate rose from 62.3 to 63.8 percent because of the substantial
increase in average age and changes in the homeownership tendencies of specific household types
(for example, married couples). Hendershott did not analyze homeownership or headship rates by
income level, race, or ethnicity; thus he shed no light on our topic. His finding that the changes in
household formation had an impact on the homeownership rate of 6.8 percentage points, holding
constant the tendency to own a home for a family of given characteristics, however, shows the
potentially large impact that changes in headship rates can have on homeownership rates.
A recent study by Haurin and Rosenthal (in press) revisited this issue and found that although
changes in headship behavior have occurred since 1970 and these changes have affected home
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ownership rates, the net effects have been somewhat modest. They found that African-American
homeownership rates in 2000 would have been roughly 3 to 5 percentage points higher, especially
for individuals in their 20s and 30s, if African Americans formed households as White families
do. For Hispanic families, the opposite holds true: Hispanic homeownership rates would be 2 to 4
percentage points lower, especially for individuals in their 20s and 30s, if Hispanic families formed
households in a manner comparable to that of White families. Thus, differences in headship behavior help to increase the size of the White–African-American homeownership gap, while the reverse
is true for White-Hispanic gaps in homeownership rates. These effects are modest, however, relative to the size of the overall gaps.

User Cost and the Relative Cost of Owning to Renting
The most common approach to modeling the tenure choice decision is the user cost method. In
this approach, the relative cost of owning compared with renting is calculated and used as a key
explanatory variable in a model of housing tenure choice (conditional on household formation).
The relative cost can be interpreted as the cost to an owner occupier of one dollar’s worth of
housing in the rental market. For many owner occupiers, that cost is less than one dollar because
of expected home price appreciation and a variety of local and federal tax policies that implicitly
favor homeownership. When the relative cost of owning is low compared with the cost of renting—holding constant the quality of the housing unit—households are more likely to become
owner occupiers. We characterize this method as a reduced form model because user cost studies
typically do not distinguish between consumption motives for owning real estate and investment
portfolio motives for owning the primary home. Early examples of the user cost approach include
studies by Laidler (1969), Aaron (1970), and Rosen (1979). The user cost varies across households
because of differences in multiple factors, such as the effective marginal income tax rates (a measure of the sensitivity of the family to the favorable tax treatment of homeownership), the expected
length of stay in the home (which affects the discounted transaction cost of buying and selling real
estate), maintenance and depreciation costs, and the expected appreciation of the value of the home.
In the United States, homeowners are not taxed on imputed rent6 from their dwellings and are
allowed to deduct mortgage interest and property tax payments but are not allowed to deduct
maintenance expenditures. In contrast, landlords are taxed on their cash rent but are allowed
deductions for mortgage interest, property taxes, and maintenance. Assuming competitive rental
markets, tax provisions that favor landlords are passed on to tenants while owner occupiers benefit
directly from the favorable tax treatment of homeownership. On balance, Rosen (1979), King
(1980), and others have shown that the net effect of these tax provisions is to subsidize the cost of
homeownership relative to rental housing for many families. Using data from the 1981 American
Housing Survey (AHS), Hoyt and Rosenthal (1990) estimated that the average cost to a U.S.
owner occupier of one dollar of housing is roughly 73.5 cents. Moreover, because the value of the
favorable tax treatment of homeownership increases with the family’s marginal income tax rate, this
figure differs across households.7
A second source of variation in the user cost of housing is the expected capital gain on the home.
Historically, house price movements have been quite variable across regions. In the long run,
however, efficiency in the real estate market would impose some discipline on these house price
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movements and ensure that risk-adjusted rates of return would be similar across locations. Over
a shorter time horizon, however, it is likely that expected capital gains on housing would differ
across regions and cities. This would give rise to regional differences in the user cost of owner-occupied housing.8 In principle, of course, capital gains benefit both landlords and, by extension,
renters, as well as owner occupiers. Historically, however, the tax code has treated capital gains
for owner occupiers more generously than for landlords.9 As a result, higher expected capital
gains likely reduce the user cost of owner-occupied housing, especially for families in higher tax
brackets.
The above argument depends implicitly on the time horizon of the prospective owner occupier,
a horizon that in turn is sensitive to the anticipated length of stay in the home. Length of stay in
the home also has a direct and powerful effect on the relative cost of owning to renting. When
buying and selling their homes, owner occupiers incur substantial transaction costs, which renters
do not incur. Realtors®, for example, typically charge 6 percent of the house value for their
services. Add to this substantial legal fees, administrative costs, and taxes, and Linneman (1986)
estimated that the cost of buying and selling a home is roughly 12 percent of the property value.
The discounted value of these transaction costs, however, declines with length of stay in the
home. Rosenthal (1988) formally incorporated these transaction costs into a user cost measure of
owner-occupied housing and found evidence consistent with the idea that transaction costs and
tax-related costs both have a similar influence on homeownership decisions.10
A number of other variations and modifications to the user cost of owner-occupied housing are
present in the literature. Other economic and demographic variables are often included in the
model in an ad hoc manner. All such studies, however, share certain features. First, they rely
heavily on the tax code to generate variation across households in the relative cost of owning to
renting. Second, investment motives for owning real estate are rarely taken explicitly into account.
Some studies incorporate investment aspects in the user cost measure by including the opportunity
cost of housing equity as the foregone return on alternative financial investments, but related
dimensions of risk and uncertainty are largely ignored (exceptions include Chinloy [1991] and
Hendershott [1997]). Instead, most user cost studies implicitly portray households as seeking the
least expensive quality adjusted price for housing services, and, in that respect, implicitly treat
housing as a pure consumption good. A different approach to modeling the decision to own or rent
the home is based on more explicit consideration of the investment aspect of housing, which is
presented in the next section.

Investment and Consumption Demands for Real Estate
In this section, we present a theoretical framework of the tenure decision developed by Henderson
and Ioannides (1983, 1987) that focuses on the interplay of investment and consumption demand
for housing. If the investment demand for housing for a given household is large relative to consumption demand, the household could choose to own a home that satisfies its portfolio motives,
including the option to rent out any remaining unwanted space (for example, a basement suite or
second house). Alternatively, if a household’s consumption demand is large relative to investment
demand (for example, when household size is large but the household believes house prices will
decline), purchasing a home sufficient to satisfy the consumption needs of the household would
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constitute a bad investment. In this case, the household is financially better off if it satisfies its
consumption demand by choosing to rent its principal residence.11
The Henderson-Ioannides model, although stylized, offers guidance on organizing the demand side
of the literature on the determinants of housing tenure choice and homeownership gaps. On the
consumption side, all the usual determinants of consumer demand are likely to apply (for example,
household size, income, and control and security of the dwelling) and thus need little elaboration.
On the investment side, we noted previously that a number of factors affect the rate of return on
housing investments such as tax treatment, transaction costs, maintenance and depreciation, and
appreciation rate. Ioannides and Rosenthal (1994) found that investment demand is more sensitive
to wealth and income than is consumption demand, although consumption demand is more sensitive to demographic variables and proximity to urban suburbs.12 These last findings have particular
implications when using the model to explain gaps in homeownership rates as will become apparent in the following paragraphs.
An important component of the consumption-investment model is the inclusion of risk as an
important factor in a household’s tenure choice decision. The characteristics of the housing stock
may vary across geographic locations in a manner that affects the risk and return on homeownership and resulting homeownership rates. The risk of substantial maintenance and renovation costs
is greater in older housing (Emrath, 1995, 1997). This housing is typically located in inner-city
areas. Furthermore, inner-city areas tend to be populated by low-income and minority households.
Because low-income households are less able than other households are to absorb financial shocks
such as catastrophic housing repair bills, they are less likely to prefer owner occupation of housing
located in inner-city areas. Evidence shows that the variance of house price changes is larger for
houses with relatively low prices (Belsky and Duda, 2002), suggesting the risk of investment is
greater for these houses. Because low-priced houses are mostly purchased by low-income households, the Henderson-Ioannides model suggests that this high variance will deter the likelihood
that these properties will be owner occupied. Sinai and Souleles (2005) suggested that owneroccupied housing provides implicit insurance against housing rent appreciation. Thus, in cities
prone to bursts of housing rent appreciation (such as large cities with land supply constraints), a
benefit of owner-occupied housing is the protection one gains against such effects. The researchers
found evidence to support the idea that cities subject to historically higher levels of housing rent
volatility have higher homeownership rates for particular age groups. Among households under
roughly age 40, no evidence exists of differences in homeownership rates between those living in
high-rent-volatility cities and those living in low-rent-volatility cities. Beginning at about age 38,
however, households living in high-volatility cities become increasingly likely to own compared
with households living in low-volatility cities, with the difference peaking at about 5 percentage
points at age 68. Thereafter, differences diminish and disappear altogether by age 80.
Another factor that explains observed racial and ethnic gaps in homeownership rates is differences
in household incomes. It is likely that investment demand rises with income faster than it does
with consumption demand, suggesting the likelihood that homeownership will rise with income.
Also, the tax advantages of homeownership rise with household income. On average, AfricanAmerican and Hispanic households have markedly lower incomes than White households and,
thus, we should expect that these minorities are more likely to be renters.13 A related factor is
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income risk. Haurin (1991) found that households with high expected volatility of future income
tend to rent even after controlling for other factors. Davidoff (2006) provided similar evidence
by demonstrating that individuals with incomes closely tied to the local real estate market were
less likely to be owner occupiers than renters, all other things being equal. In addition, Rosenthal
(2002) found that households that know what their income will be 1 year ahead are 6 percentage
points more likely to own, while households in which the household head works full-time are 10
percentage points more likely to own.14 Together, results from these studies suggest that job stability and income security are important predictors of the demand for homeownership. Such behavior
on the part of households is rational because a household with an uncertain income stream and/or
insecure employment is likely to be more risk averse. Because housing is a potentially risky asset,
homeownership is less appealing for such households. Moreover, given that African-American
and Hispanic unemployment rates have been persistently higher than unemployment rates for
comparable White households, these factors would clearly contribute to elevated homeownership
rates of White households compared with those of minorities.
Similarly, African Americans and Hispanics are less wealthy than Whites are. Although greater
wealth likely increases both investment and consumption demand for real estate, it seems likely
that increased wealth raises investment demand more than consumption demand does and thus
high-wealth households are more likely to be owners.
Lower mobility implies that the transaction costs of owning a home can be spread out over a longer
period. In the user cost framework, spreading out the transaction costs reduces the per annum
relative cost of owning compared with renting, increasing the likelihood of homeownership. Similarly, lower per annum transaction costs increase the rate of return on investing in owner-occupied
housing, and that in turn increases investment demand. Accordingly, the investment-consumption
model also predicts that lower mobility rates imply higher homeownership rates. Quigley (1987)
reported that married households are less mobile than single-headed households. Moreover, as
was noted previously, African-American households have a substantially lower marriage rate than
White households have. These differences contribute to differences in mobility rates by race and
ethnicity. The 1-year and 5-year mobility rates for Hispanics are greater than those for Whites; the
1-year rate for African Americans is also greater than that for Whites, although the 5-year rate is
about the same for both African Americans and Whites (Haurin and Gill, 2002; Herbert et al.,
2005; Schachter, 2004). On balance, both the user cost and investment-consumption models
predict that lower mobility among married and White households helps to explain higher rates of
homeownership among these groups compared with the homeownership rates of unmarried and
non-White households.
Both the user cost and investment-consumption models also suggest that expected house price
appreciation and capital gains should influence the likelihood of homeownership. Although the
empirical literature about house price appreciation is relatively well developed, few articles specifically focus on racial and ethnic differences in appreciation rates. The limited attention to racial and
ethnic differences in house price appreciation presumably reflects implicit assumptions that house
price appreciation rates are similar for White and non-White households. But, in a discriminatory
environment, this may not be the case. Suppose, for example, that in-movement of minority
households contributes to “White flight” from the local neighborhood because of discriminatory
12 Low-Income and Minority Homeownership
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attitudes. Under these conditions, the arrival of minority households would reduce demand for
housing in the neighborhood, resulting in a decline (or lower rate of increase) in real property
values, all other things being equal. On the other hand, limited housing supply for minority
households could lead to greater sensitivity of house prices (at least in the short run) to variations
in demand. For example, an influx of minority households to inner-city areas already populated by
minorities could lead to a strong appreciation of house prices in these areas. Hispanic immigrants
settling in predominately Hispanic areas of cities could precipitate this effect.
Pollakowski, Stegman, and Rohe (1991); Badcock (1989); and Kiel and Carson (1990) found that
low- and high-value houses have similar appreciation rates; both these rates are higher than those
of mid-value houses. Li and Rosenblatt (1997) argued that appreciation rates are likely to vary
if the housing market is segmented, as may be true when comparing housing in predominately
White areas with housing in other areas. Smith and Tesarek (1991); Delaney, Seward, and Smith
(1992); Mayer (1993); and Smith and Ho (1996) found that property appreciation rates depend on
the local economic climate. Mayer argued that high-price homes appreciate faster on average, but
they also are more volatile. Smith and Ho (1996) found that lower price houses are more likely to
appreciate as interest rates fall and income and employment rise. Belsky and Duda (2002) studied
the period 1982 to 1998 and found that low-priced homes in Boston, Chicago, Denver, and Philadelphia had higher appreciation rates than those of middle- or high-priced homes in these cities. In
summary, there appears to be no consensus in these studies about whether house prices rise at the
same rate for all homeowners.
Only a few studies focus on racial and ethnic differences in house price appreciation. Coates and
Vanderhoff (1993) found that the appreciation rates are similar for White and African-American
households, controlling for metropolitan area-level variables, such as population and real income
growth rates. They used AHS data for 1974 to 1983 but measured house price appreciation only
in 2- and 3-year periods because of data limitations. Kiel and Zabel (1996) also used AHS data,
selecting observations in three cities from the period 1975 to 1991 to study neighborhood-level
house price appreciation. Comparing appreciation rates of African-American and White households, they found that the results for Chicago, Philadelphia, and Denver differed greatly. Kim
(2000) studied Milwaukee and used 36,000 observations of property prices to measure house
price appreciation for 111 neighborhoods. Kim found, in general, that the greater a neighborhood’s
minority population is, the lower its annual house price appreciation is. The range is from 5.7 percent
in an all-White neighborhood (holding constant other factors at their mean values) to 1.5 percent
in an all-minority neighborhood. Kim also found that annual house price appreciation in the
poorest neighborhood is 2.6 percentage points less than it is in the wealthiest neighborhood. No
breakout of the minority household category among African Americans, Hispanics, and other
minority groups exists. Both of Kim’s major findings are relevant for our review. If low-income and
minority households’ homes appreciate at lower rates than other groups’ homes do, then low-income and minority households’ return on housing is relatively lower than that of other groups’ and
their incentive to invest in owner-occupied housing is lower as well. This finding would suggest
that at least part of the gap in homeownership rates might be explained by a rational investment
decision. The primary drawback of Kim’s study is that it is specific to one metropolitan area and
the findings cannot be generalized to the national population. Missing from the literature is an
analysis of a national sample of house price changes at the neighborhood level for a multidecade
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period. This analysis is needed to determine whether differing appreciation rates contribute to
differing investment returns for owner-occupied housing by income, race, or ethnicity. The current
empirical literature suggests that African-American, Hispanic, and White households in particular
cities should expect different rates of house price appreciation, but the expectations are likely city
and time-period specific.

The Impact of Supply-Side Determinants on Gaps in Homeownership Rates
The conceptual framework is completed by considering supply-side factors that affect the ability of
households to attain homeownership. We discuss three aspects of supply: the supply of mortgage
credit, discrimination in mortgage markets, and the location of the supply of single-family houses.
The supply of mortgage credit has a direct effect on the ability of most low-income and minority
households to buy a home. We review studies that discuss whether lenders choose to impose a
downpayment or ration mortgage credit through interest rates. The nature of the loan contract
exposes lenders to default and late-payment risk. Under certain market conditions, lenders may
respond by offering credit at below-market clearing rates and then using credit scores to ration
loanable funds to the lowest risk borrowers. We also review the many studies that provide empirical evidence on the extent and manner in which credit barriers restrict access to homeownership.
An important finding from these studies is that borrowing constraints have impeded homeownership for younger households, minorities, and low-income households.
Partly in response to concerns about minority access to mortgage credit, beginning in the early
1990s, a variety of very low-downpayment mortgage products became available through conventional lenders. Given that research has consistently found that a lack of wealth is a significant
constraint to accessing mortgage financing, these loan products offered the possibility of raising
homeownership rates. Despite these mortgage product innovations, the very low level of wealth
among minority renters is still a cause of concern. In 1998, half of African-American and Hispanic
renters had close to $0 in net wealth.15 For these households, even very low-downpayment mortgages will likely not be sufficient to make homeownership financially feasible. Moreover, these very
low-wealth households may rationally prefer to rent rather than subject themselves to the financial
risks that accompany homeownership. Another recent change in the mortgage market is that riskbased pricing is becoming common, with subprime loans growing rapidly. Racial differentials in
the use of subprime loans have engendered controversies about their net benefits.
A related set of studies provides evidence of racial discrimination in mortgage markets. Such
discrimination provides a different but clearly important explanation for differential access to mortgage credit. Because minorities often are of lower income and wealth and have less secure employment, they may be subject to statistical discrimination in loan markets to the extent that lenders
use race and ethnicity as predictors of hard-to-observe risk attributes. Such behavior is illegal in
the mortgage market. Nevertheless, a number of studies have provided evidence of discrimination
in mortgage markets.
Another supply-side factor is the type of housing stock available in different neighborhoods.
Single-family homes tend to be more conducive to owner occupation than older, multifamily
buildings are. This observation could arise because of preferences for such housing among
14 Low-Income and Minority Homeownership

Homeownership Gaps Among Low-Income and Minority Households

prospective homebuyers; that is, households could view single-family housing and homeownership
as complementary goods. In addition, single-family housing does not typically entail common
property issues. In contrast, in a multifamily building, the management and maintenance of common space and controls for noise and safety create administrative costs when organizing the units
into condominiums suitable for homeownership. For these reasons, access to single-family housing
may foster homeownership. We report evidence in the following paragraphs that, among middle
and higher income households, racial and ethnic gaps in homeownership largely disappear after
controlling for central-city location and the type of structure in which the household resides (for
example, single-family or multifamily). It is also documented that minorities of all income levels
are more likely to live in high-density central-city housing than comparable White households are.
Credit Rationing. Why might some mortgage lenders turn riskier customers away rather than set
higher interest rates? Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) suggested that three things happen when lenders
set higher interest rates, one of which is good for lenders, but the other two are potentially costly.
First, higher interest rates increase the rate of return on a loan, providing that the borrower pays the
loan back in a timely manner. But, with higher interest rates, borrowers with a strong predisposition
to make timely loan payments will likely drop out of the pool of prospective loan applicants as they
become concerned about their ability to pay the loan back. Borrowers who are more comfortable
with the possibility of making late loan payments or even defaulting will remain in the pool. This
adverse selection reduces the quality of the pool of prospective loan applicants. With limited information, it is difficult for lenders to distinguish “good” from “bad” loan applicants. In addition, with
higher loan rates, higher expected capital gains must be earned to justify homeownership from
an investment perspective. Asset market theory and related empirical studies provide compelling
evidence that higher expected returns are accompanied by increased price volatility and risk. As a
result, with high loan rates, loan applicants have an incentive to invest in riskier housing knowing
that their potential losses are truncated by their option to default. In this regard, higher interest
rates contribute to borrower behavior that is costly to lenders, a phenomenon that is typically
referred to as moral hazard. Because of adverse selection and moral hazard, it is likely that as loan
rates increase, at some point the increased return on loan payments made in a timely manner will
be offset by higher overall rates of late payments and default. For these reasons, Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) argued that lenders might set loan rates below market clearing levels and use nonrate terms
to ration the supply of credit in the face of excess demand for loanable funds.16
Of course, lenders do have sufficient information to group loan applicants at least partially on the
basis of observable differences in credit risk. For example, lenders are able to distinguish between
those loan applicants with a history of problems in paying their credit card bills on time versus
those that have a clean credit history. In this instance, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) suggested that
lenders would charge higher interest rates to the less creditworthy group, in effect pricing the
perceived difference in risk directly through the interest rate.
Duca and Rosenthal (1994b) argued that fair lending laws and the threat of costly litigation create
strong incentives for a given lender to offer similar loan rates to observationally distinguishable
borrowers. They argued that this behavior would be especially likely in cases in which lenders
thought that credit risk was correlated with politically sensitive characteristics such as race and
ethnicity, gender, and age. Under these conditions, one might expect a sorting equilibrium to
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emerge in which different lenders specialize in serving loan applicants of different credit risks; for
example, a lender may become a specialist in subprime lending. Although lenders specializing in
a given risk classification would offer similar loan rates to all prospective applicants meeting those
lenders’ credit standards, the credit market as a whole would then offer loan rates that would differ
across borrowers on the basis of default risk.
Other considerations may preclude such a sorting equilibrium. As an illustration, suppose that
non-White loan applicants, on average, pose a higher degree of default risk than White applicants
do, given differences in wealth, income, and credit history. If the sorting equilibrium described
previously prevailed, some lenders would offer lower interest rates to a largely White pool of
borrowers, while other lenders would offer higher interest rates to a disproportionately non-White
pool of borrowers. The political and legal obstacles to such differences in the racial and ethnic
composition of borrowers across lenders could be large (Rehm, 1991a, 1991b). For example,
in response to bad press and community pressure, in the early 1990s, Bank of America, N.A.,
Chemical Bank, and NationsBank announced plans to increase lending to non-Whites in the midst
of gaining approval for mergers with other banks. Moreover, approval of Bank of America, N.A.’s
merger by the Federal Reserve Board was conditional on the bank’s meeting lending goals in poor
neighborhoods (Thomas, 1992: A6).17
This discussion is predicated on the idea that lenders treat observationally distinguishable borrowers differently to earn higher returns. In that regard, the discussion satisfies definitions of
“statistical” discrimination. Statistical discrimination occurs when lenders treat loan applicants less
favorably on the basis of observable demographic attributes, such as race and ethnicity or gender
in situations in which such traits are potential predictors of higher rates of late payments and
default. As noted by Ladd (1998), in the mortgage and consumer loan market, statistical discrimination is illegal even though the expected return on pools of loans issued to two groups that differ
on the basis of race and ethnicity or gender may differ (Ross and Yinger, 2002; Yinger, 1998).
Another change in mortgage markets over the past decade that has tended to reduce constraints
imposed by conventional underwriting is the growth in subprime mortgage lending. Between
1993 and 2001, the number of loans reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
by lenders primarily engaged in subprime lending increased 10-fold, from 100,000 to more
than a million loans for refinancing and home purchases. Subprime loans provide borrowers an
opportunity to obtain mortgage funding even if they have impaired credit, have income levels that
are low compared with their housing costs or total debt levels, or seek loan amounts that exceed
the value of their home. Before the advent of subprime lending, it was difficult for homebuyers or
homeowners to find sources of mortgage financing if they failed to meet conventional underwriting
guidelines. Although subprime lending increases borrowing opportunities for some households,
borrowers face higher interest rates and fees to compensate lenders for the higher risks of these loans.
During the 1990s, most subprime loans were used to refinance existing mortgages and so were not
used to spur increases in homeownership. In recent years, the number of subprime loans for home
purchases has grown fairly rapidly—particularly among minority homebuyers—which means these
loans could potentially contribute to increases in homeownership rates. Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2006) reported that in 2005, 54.7 percent of the conventional home purchase loans originated
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to African Americans were identified in HMDA data as high-cost loans, as were 46.1 percent of the
conventional home purchase loans originated to Hispanics.18
Although subprime lending activity among minorities has increased markedly in recent years, we
should emphasize that it is not clear whether this trend represents an increase in the availability of
mortgage financing or whether minorities are paying more than necessary for their loans. A wealth
of anecdotal evidence indicates that alongside the growth in subprime loans has come an increase
in predatory practices that take advantage of borrowers’ lack of familiarity with the mortgage market. These practices include charging fees and interest rates far in excess of that needed to offset
risk; see, for example, the joint report on predatory lending by the U.S. Department of the Treasury
and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2000). In some cases, these loans
also may be underwritten without regard to a borrower’s ability to repay the loan, thus making
default and foreclosure more likely. These predatory loans also include loan terms and conditions
that limit borrowers’ ability to get out of these problem loans. A number of studies have found that
subprime lending appears to be disproportionately concentrated in African-American and Hispanic
neighborhoods because subprime lenders have higher market shares in high-income minority
areas than they do in low-income White areas (Scheessele, 2002). In many instances, however,
these studies suffer from a lack of information about credit risk that is needed to demonstrate that
subprime lending is inappropriately concentrated in minority neighborhoods. Exceptions include
studies by Bocian, Ernst, and Li (2006) and Calem, Gillen, and Wachter (2004). Bocian, Ernst, and
Li (2006) merged HMDA data with detailed information on borrower and loan characteristics from
a large national database of subprime mortgage originations, including the borrowers’ credit scores.
They found that both African Americans and Latinos were one-third more likely than Whites with
the same credit scores to get a high-cost loan. Calem, Gillen, and Wachter (2004) examined HMDA
lending in Chicago and Philadelphia using better measures of neighborhood credit risk than those
used in previous studies and found that, at least for African Americans, subprime lending shares
are not fully explained by measures of risk at the neighborhood level. Although none of these
studies are definitive, based on the limited evidence thus far, it is not clear whether the advent of
subprime lending has had a positive impact on homeownership, given the higher interest rates,
fees, and foreclosure risk associated with these loans.
The empirical literature presents convincing evidence that lack of wealth reduces the likelihood of
attaining homeownership even if it is rational for the household to make the investment (Duca and
Rosenthal, 1991, 1994a; Engelhardt, 1996; Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter, 1997; Linneman
and Wachter, 1989; Zorn, 1989). Mortgage lenders have traditionally required buyers to contribute
to the purchase of a home. The purpose of the downpayment is to have the buyer share the risk of
price fluctuations and thus ensure that buyers have an incentive to maintain the property and to
avoid the cost of a foreclosure. Masnick (2001) reported that loan-to-value (LTV) ratios were relatively low in the early part of the 20th century, typically 50 percent in the late 1920s. In the 1930s,
government-backed mortgages were developed and Fannie Mae came into existence. In the 1970s,
the standard downpayment was expected to be 20 percent of the purchase price, with selected
exceptions. Throughout the 1990s, the minimal required downpayment continued to fall. Freddie
Mac introduced the Affordable Gold programs in 1992, consisting of a 5-percent downpayment
program. Freddie Mac’s Affordable Gold 97 program further reduced the downpayment requirement to 3 percent. Downpayment reductions to 0 percent have also been achieved.19
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Homeownership may also be impeded by barriers that reduce access to credit, such as a lack of
history for meeting past debt obligations, high current levels of debt, or a lack of documented
income to support the extension of credit. A recent study by Rosenthal (2002) used data from the
1998 Survey of Consumer Finances to estimate the demand for homeownership while controlling
for the influence of credit barriers. Central to the study are a set of survey questions that enabled
the researcher to determine, a priori, whether the individual household perceived itself to have
been subject to binding credit barriers of any type (for example, mortgage, auto credit, and
consumer credit). Then, controlling for sample selection, Rosenthal (2002) estimated the demand
for homeownership among households not subject to credit barriers and used the results to predict
the demand for homeownership for the entire sample. Comparing predicted to actual homeownership rates provides an estimate of the influence of credit barriers on homeownership. For the U.S.
population as a whole, Rosenthal estimated that credit barriers depress homeownership rates by
a little more than 4 percentage points. The estimates were 4.1 percentage points for White households, 6.7 percentage points for Hispanic households, and just 1.3 percentage points for African
American households. Although sampling variation and the normal degree of imprecision in such
estimates must be kept in mind, these estimates suggest that credit barriers account for little of the
overall racial and ethnic gaps in homeownership. Moreover, given that Rosenthal’s study provided
only modest controls for credit history (specifically, the study controls for history of late loan
and credit card payments and evidence of past bankruptcies), the possibility of omitted variables
remains. Omitted household attributes almost always work in the direction of inflating estimated
race-related effects in the homeownership literature. These estimates, therefore, may provide an
upper bound on the extent to which credit barriers exacerbate racial gaps in homeownership.
Rosenthal also summarized the influence of credit barriers on homeownership rates by income
category. Among households in the upper half of the income distribution, credit barriers have little
or no discernible effect on homeownership rates. Credit barriers, however, depress homeownership
rates by roughly 7 percentage points among individuals in the 10th to the 50th income percentiles
and by 11 percentage points among individuals in the bottom income decile. To put these estimates
in perspective, Rosenthal also reported that, compared with households in the third income quartile,
homeownership rates are 39.4 percentage points lower for households in the bottom decile, 24.9
percentage points lower for households between the 10th and 25th percentiles, and 14.1 percentage points lower for households in the 2nd income quartile. Thus, although credit barriers may
account for an important portion of the gap in homeownership rates between households in the
third and second income quartiles, in general, something other than credit barriers appears to drive
much of the difference in homeownership rates between high- and low-income households.
Why did Rosenthal (2002) find that the influence of credit barriers on homeownership rates was
so “low,” especially with respect to racial gaps in homeownership? One possibility is the dramatic
innovations in the mortgage market that have occurred since the late 1980s, including the
dramatic growth in subprime lending described previously. Rosner and Fisher (2002) reported that
in 1989, just 7 percent of home mortgages were issued with LTV ratios in excess of 90 percent, but
that frequency increased steadily through the 1990s. The increase in high LTV loans reflects the
introduction of an entirely new set of mortgage products in the past decade. These loan opportunities complemented the continued presence of longstanding low-downpayment mortgages issued
through government-insured programs such as that of the Federal Housing Administration.
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How do downpayment constraints affect racial and ethnic gaps in homeownership rates? Numerous studies using different data sets spanning multiple decades show that African Americans and
Hispanics have substantially lower wealth than Whites do (Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter,
1996; Herbert et al., 2005; Lusardi, Cossa, and Krupka, 2000). This difference in wealth, combined with the existence of downpayment constraints, likely contributed to the observed gaps in
homeownership rates.
Another way that the downpayment constraint affects homeownership is related to the spatial distribution of minority households compared with that of Whites. Compared with Whites, minorities tend to disproportionately reside in the largest central cities and thus minorities are likely to
pay a higher price for the same quality housing than Whites pay. This trend occurs because of the
premium associated with proximity to the central business district and because house prices are
positively correlated with metropolitan area populations. These higher prices make it more difficult
to accumulate the needed downpayment and thus discourage renters from becoming homeowners.
This discouragement effect has been documented by Yoshikawa and Ohtake (1989), who used
Japanese data and found that renters in areas with low land prices were more likely to save
money to become homeowner and those in high-cost areas were more likely to give up on trying
to become homeowners and thus effectively stopped saving money to purchase a home. Also,
Engelhardt (1994) found some evidence that the high prices of houses discouraged renters from
participating in a Canadian tax-advantaged plan designed to encourage households to save for their
downpayments. Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter (2001) found that as constant-quality house
prices increased, renters’ savings initially rose but then fell when house prices were very high.
Their explanation for the reversal was that when house prices increased to high levels, renters’
expectations of becoming homeowners fell.
As noted earlier, the downpayment constraint has been weakened substantially in recent years
but the homeownership gap has not decreased in the past decade. Possible explanations include
(1) the impact of the wealth constraint was relatively small and thus its elimination would have
only a minimal effect (as suggested by Rosenthal [2002]), (2) the effect will take longer to work out
because it takes a while for households to recognize the change in the market structure, and (3) the
number of White renters near the margin of becoming homeowners was relatively large and thus
relaxation of the downpayment constraint increased the number of White owners substantially (for
example, moved homeownership forward in the life cycle), while the number of African-American
and Hispanic renters near the margin of homeownership was smaller compared with the number
of inframarginal minority renters.20 Thus, relaxing the downpayment constraint would increase the
homeownership rate for all households but not close the gap.
Discrimination in the Mortgage Market. We previously commented on statistical discrimination.
A very different form of discrimination arises when lenders have a “taste” for discrimination. In this
instance, lenders forgo profit-making opportunities to avoid doing business with a particular group
of individuals (for example, minority loan applicants). This form of discrimination is illegal and
also has been the subject of study. The most prominent approach used by studies in this area is to
examine the accept-reject decisions on mortgage loan applications as a function of the characteristics of the loan applicants, including race and ethnicity. Munnell et al. (1996) is the most influential of these studies. Using HMDA data augmented with additional information on the attributes of
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the loan applicants, the researchers found that, after controlling for loan applicant characteristics,
African-American loan applicants in Boston in the late 1980s were 8 percentage points more likely
to have their loan applications rejected than comparable White loan applicants were. The Munnell
et al. (1996) study has been subject to numerous critiques. In response, the authors made their
data available to other researchers and subsequent exhaustive examination confirmed the essential
features of their results (see Carr and Megbolugbe [1993] or Ladd [1998], for example). The broad
consensus emerging from these efforts is that discrimination has been present in mortgage lending
at least through the 1980s and is likely still present today (Yinger, 1998).
Berkovec et al. (1998) found that African-American mortgage default rates were higher than White
default rates after controlling for a variety of household attributes. Using Becker-type arguments
(Becker, 1971, 1993), the authors argued that this result was consistent with an environment in
which lenders apply less restrictive credit standards to African Americans and more restrictive
standards to Whites. In addition, the authors also took care to note that omitted variables could
potentially account for their results. A study by Cotterman (2002) that replicates the analysis of
Berkovec et al. (1998) but incorporates credit score measures found that the inclusion of this variable generally renders the race effect statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, controversy stemming
from the Berkovec et al. (1998) work became sufficiently energetic that the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (1996) devoted an entire issue of Cityscape to comments on the
work and responses by Berkovec and his co-authors. At the core of the debate were concerns about
how omitted variables possibly would confound the interpretation of the outcome from default
studies. Ladd (1998) summarized the central issues in this debate well when she wrote—
… Working in one direction, the presence of the unobservable factors disproportionately increases the likelihood of Blacks defaulting on any approved loan.
Working in the other direction, taste-based or profit-motivated discrimination
decreases the likelihood of default for Blacks because fewer loans are approved
to that group.
In other words, omitted factors related to discrimination could serve to either increase or decrease
African-American households’ default rates relative to those of comparable White borrowers. For
that reason, Ladd (1998) concluded that default studies are hampered by identification problems,
but these problems are less severe in the context of accept-reject studies of mortgage applications
such as Munnell et al. (1996).

The Availability of a “Suitable” Housing Stock for Homeownership
In 1975, Kain and Quigley (1975) suggested that because African Americans were concentrated in
inner-city neighborhoods, residential segregation constrained the type of housing stock available
to African-American households and thus might serve to limit homeownership among inner-city
minorities.21
In part, Kain and Quigley (1975) motivated the idea of supply constraints by drawing an analogy to the then recently developed notion of a spatial mismatch in which suburbanization of
manufacturing jobs coupled with suburban housing market discrimination reduces employment
opportunities for African-American households. In the context of homeownership, Kain and Quig20 Low-Income and Minority Homeownership
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ley (1975) argued that single-family detached housing stock is more conducive to homeownership
than multifamily housing is. Thus, if discrimination restricts access to single-family suburban
neighborhoods, African Americans will disproportionately locate in central cities. Because centralcity areas have higher levels of multifamily housing than the suburbs do, restrictions on access to
suburban neighborhoods could limit homeownership rates among minorities. Kain and Quigley
(1975) provided support for this idea by demonstrating that differences between African-American
and White homeownership rates are higher in metropolitan areas in which the central cities have
a lower share of single-family housing stock. They also showed that the share of African-American
households living in the suburbs further reduces White–African-American gaps in homeownership
rates, although this effect appears to not be as strong as the influence of the availability of centralcity, single-family housing stock.
Both the original work by Kain and Quigley (1975) and more recent work by Herbert (1997) focused
on a potentially provocative but also relatively little-studied idea: constraints on access to the
supply of different types of housing (for example, single-family versus multifamily housing) might
contribute to the relatively low rate of homeownership. The purpose of this section is to review
the conceptual foundation for these ideas. First, we briefly review well-established arguments for
why low-income households concentrate in central cities regardless of race or ethnicity. Next, we
recognize that central cities exhibit higher land prices and, as a result, a greater frequency of highdensity residential and nonresidential buildings. Discrimination and the historically low-income
status of minorities together ensure that minority households will be segregated in central-city
locations, reducing proximity to single-family housing. The question then arises concerning why
this trend would necessarily reduce minority homeownership rates. Although it is beyond the
scope of this study to answer that question, we speculate about some possible answers.
Stratification of Households by Income. A well-established principle in urban theory concerns
the tradeoff between proximity to employment and house price. In the simplest economic model,
all employment is located in the central city and residential locations differ only in their distance
to the downtown area. Assuming that households dislike long commutes, in competitive markets
the prices of houses far from the central city fall to compensate for longer commutes and a spatial
equilibrium is attained. In practice, this scenario implies that the price per unit of housing is lower
in the suburbs than it is in the central city.22 As shown by Muth (1969), the rate at which qualityadjusted house prices decline with reduced proximity to employment centers is driven by the cost
of commuting relative to housing demand. This model predicts that as incomes increase, if housing
demand rises more quickly than marginal commuting costs do, high-income households will
outbid low-income households for suburban sites suitable for larger homes with larger lots. On the
other hand, by grouping lower income households together in multifamily structures, developers
of high-density, low-income housing can outbid high-income households for central-city sites,
even though such sites are close to the dominant employment center. Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (in press) recently reexamined the idea that tradeoffs between commuting costs and housing
demand lead to stratification of high- and low-income households into predominantly suburban
and central-city locations. Using the AHS, they presented evidence that the income elasticity of
demand for lot size is actually quite low. Unless the income elasticity of commuting costs is similarly low, the researchers argued that some other phenomena must account for the concentration of
low-income households in the central cities.23 In the end, they argued that low-income households
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concentrate in the central cities at least in part to take advantage of public transportation essential
for households with limited access to automobiles. Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (2000) also
presented evidence that services for the poor provided by the central city are more generous than
those provided by suburban communities.
A third argument is markedly different; discrimination against minorities is present in the housing
market (Turner et al., 2002). For example, “steering” by real estate agents could result in segregated
neighborhoods. Given the low-income status of many urban minorities, it seems virtually certain
that all three explanations help account for the continued concentration of low-income minority
households in the central cities.
Central Cities, Multifamily Housing, and Homeownership Rates. The key question is whether
the concentration of minority households in the central cities restricts minority homeownership
rates. The “supply constraint” hypothesis posited by Kain and Quigley (1975) and Herbert
(1997) argues that reduced minority access to single-family detached housing lowers minority
homeownership rates because homeownership and single-family housing are complements. On the
other hand, given the low-income status of many minorities, it is entirely possible that central-city
minority households disproportionately rent because they prefer to do so, an outcome implied by
the tenure choice model discussed earlier.
Using data from the 1999 AHS, we find that among high-income households almost no difference
exists in homeownership rates by race and ethnicity among dwellers of single-family detached
housing, regardless of location.24 Nevertheless, the overall homeownership rate for high-income
White households is nearly 10 percentage points higher than that for similar African-American
and other minority high-income households. That difference is clearly driven by differences in the
propensity to live in single-family detached housing and, more generally, to live in neighborhoods
in which single-family detached housing is found. Racial and ethnic differences in homeownership
are also quite modest among middle-income households after controlling for structure type and
location, although these differences are not as small as they are among higher income households.
Among low-income households, substantial racial and ethnic differences exist in homeownership
rates across the board, regardless of location and housing type.
What could be driving these patterns? Alba, Logan, and Stults (2000) reported that—
… middle income suburban Blacks live with many more Whites than do poor
inner-city Blacks. But their neighborhoods are not the same as those of Whites
with the same socioeconomic characteristics … middle class Blacks tend to live
with neighbors who are less affluent than they are ….
Suppose that lower income inner-city neighborhoods are more subject to crime and other social
ills than higher income neighborhoods are. The lower income neighborhoods would likely be
viewed as riskier places in which to invest in owner-occupied housing. Unless such risks were
offset by sufficiently high expected returns, we would expect higher income residents of such
neighborhoods to exhibit lower homeownership rates than households of comparably high income
in middle- and upper-income neighborhoods. Thus, neighborhoods accessible to middle-income
and higher income inner-city minorities might be higher risk environments in which to invest
in homeownership compared with neighborhoods available to Whites of similar income levels.
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Returning to the tenure choice model addressed earlier in this article, all other things being equal,
increased risk pushes down the housing investment demand function and reduces the likelihood
that households would choose to become homeowners. The factors that cause the outcomes observed by Alba, Logan, and Stults (2000) could indirectly contribute to the observed racial gap in
homeownership rates. For example, the underlying causal factors could include minorities facing
discrimination in the housing market or racial differences in the taste for neighborhoods.
A related issue is the process governing the organization of units within a multifamily building into
a condominium arrangement. Suppose, for example, that administrative costs associated with the
organization of multifamily buildings into condominiums are present. Consider also the role of
within-building neighborhood externalities and suppose that crime and noisy behavior are more
prevalent in lower income buildings than in higher income buildings. Owners of low-income
rental units may then prefer to own entire buildings instead of single units. This scenario would
give property owners the ability to evict noisy or dangerous tenants. In contrast, in a multifamily
condominium arrangement, owners of individual units would have less ability to police disruptive
behavior within the building. This scenario might lower demand for the site and reduce the return
to property owners because of lower rents. Nevertheless, if crime and noise were less prevalent
among occupants of middle and higher income multifamily buildings, then one would expect such
buildings to be organized into condominiums at a higher rate.
Empirical Studies of the Supply of Single-Family Housing and Homeownership Rates.
McDonald (1974) provided further evidence to support Kain and Quigley’s (1975) supply restriction hypothesis. McDonald’s (1974) goal was to decompose the shortfall in African-American
homeownership rates attributable to discrimination into a portion related to a lack of housing
available for homeownership and a portion related to African Americans’ inability to obtain
mortgage financing. Using data gathered as part of the 1965 Detroit Regional Transportation and
Land Use Study, McDonald (1974) estimated a set of simultaneous equations for the choices of
homeownership and of occupying a single-family structure (including a duplex). McDonald (1974)
argued that if a lack of single-family houses accounts for the entire shortfall in African-American
homeownership, the coefficient on the race variable would be significantly different from 0 only in
the equation predicting structure type and not in the equation predicting tenure, given structure
type. His results suggest that of the total unexplained shortfall in African-American homeownership of 10 percentage points, 5.5 points were related to lower occupancy of single-family structures
by African Americans and the remaining 4.5 points were related to lower homeownership of
occupied single-family homes. McDonald (1974) attributed this shortfall to African Americans’
relative inability to obtain mortgage financing.
Working in the opposite direction, Flippen (2001a) provided evidence that is not consistent with
the presence of a single-family housing supply constraint. She examined the impact of segregation
in his analysis of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for 1992. Using five different measures
of segregation for 64 metropolitan areas, she found mixed evidence that the greater segregation
is, the lower African-American and Hispanic homeownership is. Flippen (2001a) included the
percentage of old dwellings and the percentage single-family dwellings as explanatory variables but
neither was significant for African Americans and only the percentage of single-family dwellings
was significant for Hispanics. Moreover, she noted that court-ordered busing in the 1970s resulted
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in White flight in many central cities. One outcome of these events was an increase in minority
access to the existing central-city stock of single-family dwellings as White households vacated
such dwellings for the suburbs. Thus, court-ordered busing would serve to relax constraints on the
supply of single-family housing for minority households.
Another paper that also casts doubt on the presence of a single-family housing supply constraint is
recent work by Deng, Ross, and Wachter (2003). Using 1985 data from the metropolitan version of
the AHS for Philadelphia, the authors estimated nested multinomial logit models of housing tenure
choice that took neighborhood location within the Philadelphia metropolitan area into account.
The study did not find any evidence to support the idea that racial differences in location within
the metropolitan area affect homeownership. Research by Herbert (1997), however, indicates that
Philadelphia has a much higher concentration of single-family housing in the central city than
is typical of major cities in the United States. Moreover, the original Kain and Quigley (1975)
work emphasized that it is the combination of segregation in conjunction with a concentration of
high-density, central-city housing that restricts homeownership opportunities for minorities. To
the extent that Philadelphia is highly segregated but otherwise offers a plentiful supply of centralcity, single-family housing, then racial segregation in the Philadelphia housing market would not
necessarily be expected to contribute to racial disparities in access to homeownership. Among
the 50 metropolitan areas studied by Herbert (1997), Philadelphia was among the areas with the
smallest unexplained residual in White homeownership rates compared with African-American
homeownership rates. More generally, whether racial segregation in conjunction with high-density,
central-city development patterns restricts minority homeownership remains an open question, an
area in need of additional research.

Racial Gaps in Homeownership Rates
Despite the gains that minorities have made since the 1960s in both economic affluence and in
legal protection from housing market discrimination, over the past 30 years, little improvement in
minority homeownership rates has occurred compared with White homeownership rates.25 Studies
of racial and ethnic differences in homeownership rates can be characterized as identifying two
broad categories of factors that contribute to minority households having a lower probability of
homeownership. One category relates to differences between Whites and minorities in a range of
demographic and economic factors. The other category relates to unobserved variables that include
discrimination and a lack of households understanding the homebuying and mortgage finance
processes.
Early studies of homeownership gaps assumed that the factors influencing households to become
homeowners were the same for minorities and Whites and that both groups’ behavioral responses
to these factors were the same. The studies separated the gap into two components: one due to
differences in endowments and the other to an unexplained residual amount. In these studies,
the magnitude of the residual shortfall in the probability of homeownership attributed to race
rather than endowments ranged up to 20 percentage points depending on the time period and the
sample. Subsequent studies dropped these restrictive assumptions and followed a more general
technique to decompose the homeownership gap into effects due to differences in socioeconomic
variables and the residual amount.
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Over time, a downward trend has occurred in the estimated size of the residual component of
the White-minority homeownership gaps. Also, studies of newly formed households and recent
movers found single-digit gaps in homeownership after differences in endowment were taken into
account. The decreasing size of the residual could occur because recent studies have used a more
comprehensive set of socioeconomic explanatory variables because the quality of data sets has improved. Or, the decreasing size of the residual could be due to a smaller impact of discrimination
in the mortgage and housing markets. The latter conclusion is consistent with the establishment
and enforcement of a number of policies that monitor mortgage markets and brokerage services
and enforce fair housing laws. To date, most studies that have noted a decline in the residual
component of the homeownership gap have attributed this change to reduced discrimination. By
contrast, it is also clear that researchers are now including more and better explanatory variables in
their analyses and thus reducing the size of the unexplained residual.
Current estimates of the residual gap appear to be in the range of 5 to 10 percentage points. This
remaining unexplained gap may be accounted for by potentially important explanatory variables,
such as a household’s expected mobility, credit history, income variability, willingness to take financial risks, and understanding of the homebuying and mortgage finance processes, that generally
have not been captured by these studies. A few recent studies have “explained” the entire racial gap
in homeownership. These findings, however, should not be construed as providing evidence that
existing antidiscrimination laws are obsolete. Rather, it is possible that the intertemporal decline in
and current modest-sized, race-related residuals from homeownership gap studies result, at least
in part, from government policies and oversight regarding discriminatory treatment in housing
and mortgage markets. By contrast, the degree to which current government legislation has helped
reduce the size of race-related disparities in homeownership is unknown.
A general criticism of existing studies is the lack of linkage between the theory of homeownership and the set of explanatory variables included in empirical studies of homeownership gaps.
This failure results in the omission of important concepts (for example, income stability) and it
complicates the interpretation of included variables. For example, age and marital status become
proxies for expected mobility and income becomes a proxy for the tax benefits of homeownership.
Furthermore, theory suggests that the effects of variables such as income and its interaction with
the tax code should have nonlinear effects. Few studies of gaps in homeownership allow for such
nonlinearities.
Another general problem with the literature on homeownership gaps is that it trails advances that
have been made in the study of the propensity of a given household to become a homeowner. Most
current studies of whether and when households become homeowners adopt an intertemporal
approach, using information on changes in household circumstances over time to predict future
choices. In contrast, apart from the occasional use of permanent rather than current income,
studies of homeownership gaps are typically silent regarding intertemporal aspects of homeownership and instead rely exclusively on current household attributes to predict tenure choice. In
many cases, studies of gaps in homeownership appear to have not advanced very much beyond
methods used in the 1970s to estimate the probability of homeownership. In contrast, studies of
the likelihood that individual households become homeowners have used panel data and related
econometric methods for two decades. Although the homeownership literature recognizes that
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a household’s current tenure status will affect its future housing tenure choices, little recognition
of this intertemporal dependence is given in the homeownership gaps literature. Although the
literature on the propensity for homeownership also recognizes that expectations of future events
affect current tenure choice decisions, the literature on homeownership gaps generally fails to take
this point into account.
Two broad but compelling conclusions emerge from our review of the literature. First, additional
efforts targeting discrimination in housing and mortgage markets and a lack of information about
the homebuying process are unlikely to narrow racial gaps in homeownership by more than 5 to
10 percentage points. That in turn implies that future efforts to narrow aggregate White-minority
gaps in homeownership should primarily focus on addressing the differences in household
circumstances by race—including wealth, income, education levels, and marital status—which
account for the large majority of the observed difference in rates. Indeed, that is the conclusion
of a recent study by Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005) that examined the determinants of Whiteminority homeownership gaps from 1983 to 2001 using a common set of data (different years of
the Survey of Consumer Finances [SCF]), variables, and methods. In that regard, the fact that so
much of the homeownership gap is attributable to the generally lower socioeconomic standing of
minorities suggests that policies that address broader societal factors will be needed to close these
gaps. Factors that are important to supporting homeownership but may fall outside the range
of homeownership policies include enhanced job opportunities, job security, marital status, and
household stability. Creating an environment that is conducive to financial and household security
for minorities is a challenging task but is one that policymakers must grapple with if they are to
substantially reduce current racial gaps in homeownership. A second conclusion from this review
is that considerable opportunities are present for further research to expand our knowledge of the
determinants of income-related and race- and ethnicity-related gaps in homeownership.

Empirical Studies of Homeownership Gaps
Among earlier empirical studies, the dominant method used to control for race-related effects
was to include dummy variables for racial status (for example, African American, Hispanic, and
Asian). More recently, a number of studies have begun to adopt a “decomposition” approach
that follows methods originated by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). Applying this method
to housing tenure, homeownership models are estimated separately by race and the coefficients
from one group are used to predict the behavior of other groups while also being compared with
the actual homeownership rates in the population. This approach separates total differences in
homeownership rates into an endowment effect due to differences in household characteristics and
a residual effect due to unexplained differences in the group including discriminatory treatment in
the market.26 This approach is more general than simply including racial dummy variables because
it implicitly includes an entire set of interactive variables that allow race to modify the influence of
all other variables included in the model (for example, income and age). The alternative dummy
variable approach, in comparison, implicitly assumes that racial status shifts the propensity for
homeownership by the same amount for all individuals belonging to a given race, regardless of
income, household composition, and so on. Comparisons of results across decomposition and
dummy variable studies should, therefore, keep these differences in mind.
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Studies Using the Dummy Variable Approach. The first work to focus on homeownership gaps
was provided by Kain and Quigley (1972), who studied households in St. Louis. Controlling for a
variety of demographic factors, the researchers found that the likelihood of homeownership among
African-American households was 8.8 percentage points lower than the likelihood of homeownership among comparable White households, when using a generalized least squares regression
model.27 Their control variables included income, education, job tenure, marital status, gender,
age, household size, number of children, and prior housing tenure status. Clearly, some of the
household attributes thought to influence homeownership were omitted and are likely reflected by
the race dummy variable. In addition, the race dummy variable may reflect the influence of supplyside constraints, such as restricted access to single-family neighborhoods and mortgage credit.
Roistacher and Goodman (1976) replicated Kain and Quigley’s (1972) method using data from the
1971 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the 24 largest metropolitan areas. They found
that the race effect, as measured by a coefficient on a dummy variable for African Americans in
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, ranged from 17.0 to 19.1 percentage points.
Roistacher and Goodman (1976) also estimated a logit model using the same data. When evaluated at the sample means of other variables, the logit model yielded an even greater disparity in
homeownership associated with race of 26.3 percentage points. When Roistacher and Goodman
(1976) studied a sample of recent movers, however, they found no difference in the likelihood of
homeownership by African Americans or Hispanics. This study was the first to suggest that existing gaps would disappear over time as households relocated.28
Long and Caudill (1992) analyzed White–African-American differences in homeownership using
the 1986 Current Population Survey (CPS). Their explanatory variables include permanent and
transitory income, a measure of wealth derived by capitalizing income from investments, the fraction of income received from welfare, and dummy variables for age, employment status, veteran
status, household size, the South region, central-city location, and race. They omitted expected
house price appreciation, credit histories, mobility, income and job stability, and education. In
addition, they deviated from most other studies by restricting their sample to married couples and
excluding mobile homes. These restrictions make it difficult to compare Long and Caudill’s (1992)
results with those of other studies. Using the dummy variable approach, they found that being
African American was associated with a 6.3-percentage-point lower probability of homeownership.
Krivo (1986) provided another study using the dummy variable method when she used AHS data
from 1981 to study the homeownership gap between White and Hispanic households. Controlling for income, education, age, number of children, region, and urban location, she found that
Hispanics were 10 percentage points less likely to own than Whites were. By contrast, Hispanics
are not a homogeneous group and the residual component of the gap varied substantially across
subgroups, equaling 26 percentage points for Puerto Ricans and 19 percentage points for Cubans
but only 4 percentage points for Mexican Americans.29 Krivo (1986) attributed these gaps to location, discrimination that causes segregation (for example, less-than-preferential treatment by real
estate agents and mortgage lenders), and immigrant status and housing cost. Unlike other studies
employing dummy variables for race, Krivo’s study (1986) also explored differences in the explanatory power of individual household attributes both between Hispanics and Whites and across
Hispanic subgroups. Nevertheless, she did not use the Oaxaca-Blinder method to decompose
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the total gap into separate parts that were attributable to differences in endowments and to an
unexplained residual.
Haurin and Morrow-Jones (2006), using 2005 survey������������������������������������������
������������������������������������������������
data from Columbus, Ohio, focused on the
role that the amount of information households had about the housing and mortgage markets
played in the households’ tenure decisions. They first estimated a standard model using typical
explanatory variables (age, marital status, education, income, wealth, gender, immigrant status,
and house price) and found a White–African-American residual of 15 percentage points. They then
augmented the list of variables to include a measure of credit quality, the likelihood of moving, and
a new measure of real estate market knowledge (all were statistically significant). The coefficient
of the African-American dummy variable falls in value from 15 to 6 percentage points. Their final
estimation that treated the real estate knowledge variable as endogenous further reduced the size
of the dummy variable for African Americans to 3.5 percentage points, and it is not statistically
significant. What factors explain the total gap in homeownership rates? Haurin and Morrow-Jones
(2006) found that both credit quality and information about the real estate market are important
and each explains at least 7 percentage points of the gap (the rest of the gap is explained by the
standard set of explanatory variables). Although this study is limited to one geographic area and
considers only White–African-American comparisons of homeownership rates, its findings suggest
that in the current housing market environment, the impact of discrimination on the homeownership gap is minimal.30 This study also emphasizes the importance of racial differences in the
quantity of information about the housing and mortgage markets that renters have and the role
that this information plays in facilitating homeownership.
The role that information about the real estate and mortgage markets plays in tenure choice decisions also is emphasized in two studies that found that Hispanics are less likely to have accurate
information about homeownership than other populations are (Fannie Mae, 2003; Lee, Tornatzky,
and Torres, 2004). This lack of understanding includes information about the homebuying process, the importance of a person’s financial history, and the mortgage qualification process. There
also is evidence that Hispanics have a lower level of financial literacy than other populations have
and tend to distrust mainstream financial institutions (Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute,
2004). The lack of a relationship with a financial institution leads some Hispanics to seek advice
from informal sources such as a family member or friend or to rely on “cultural brokers” such as
bilingual real estate agents, housing advocates, or lenders (Ratner, 1996). In some cases, these
advisors are not a good source of advice. Focus groups conducted in 11 cities throughout the
country suggest that Hispanics are quick to trust “anyone who speaks their language and knows
their community,” but often these trusted sources turn out to be predatory lenders and real estate
agents (Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute, 2004).
Recent evidence suggests that many Hispanics have poor credit, which hinders their ability to
become homeowners. In a recent study, Bostic, Calem, and Wachter (2004) used data from
the SCF (1989, 1995, 1998, and 2001 surveys) to assess trends in credit quality across various
segments of the U.S. population stratified by demographic characteristics and they quantified
the extent to which credit quality constraints play an important role in a household’s decision to
pursue homeownership opportunities. The researchers identified an individual as constrained by
credit if his or her score was below 660 (or the 25th percentile of the score distribution).31 Overall,
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the study suggests that median credit scores across all individuals in the national sample increased
from 721.3 in 1989 to 730.1 in 2001. The percentage of individuals who were credit constrained
also increased slightly, from 19.3 percent to 24.5 percent, during the study period. The median
score among Hispanics decreased from 695 in 1989 to 670 in 2001. The proportion of Hispanics
who fell below the 660 threshold increased significantly from 25.4 to 48.5 during the same time
period. Moreover, these results are especially dramatic for Hispanic renters. The predicted score
decreased significantly for Hispanic renters from 685.2 to 623.7, and the proportion of credit-constrained Hispanics increased dramatically from 20.5 percent to 63.3 percent. The study, however,
does not shed any light on the cause of these trends. Among the possibilities offered by the authors
are that the large increases in homeownership during the 1990s occurred primarily among the
highest credit quality renters among low-income and minority groups, which has deteriorated the
average credit quality among remaining renters. The authors also speculated that changes in the
characteristics of recent immigrants, who are more likely to be renters, may have contributed to the
deterioration of credit quality among renters. Clearly, declining credit quality of minority renters
will tend to keep homeownership gaps at high levels.
Studies Using the Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Approach. Silberman, Yochum, and Ihlanfeldt (1982) argued that past discrimination might restrict current opportunities and decisions to
own a home. In addition, they argued that, although older households are less likely to change
their behaviors even if laws and discriminatory practices change, younger households will respond
to a changing environment. To examine these issues they evaluated homeownership probabilities
for White and African-American households using PSID data for 1974 and 1978. Their primary
approach was to estimate separate probit equations for African Americans and Whites and then
statistically decompose the total racial difference in propensity to buy into a part related to differences in household characteristics and a part related to an unexplained residual. Although they
found a large residual racial gap in homeownership of 22.5 percentage points in 1974, the race
effect fell to 18.3 percentage points by 1978. In addition, the researchers tested their hypothesis
that new households would be more responsive to changes in their environment (for example, new
laws and less discrimination) by examining the propensity of newly formed households to become
homeowners. Consistent with their arguments, the residual homeownership race effect was smaller
for new households: 15.9 percentage points in 1974 and 8.2 percentage points in 1978. Based on
the decline in race-related effects over their sample horizon, the researchers concluded that the
influence of discrimination on homeownership diminished after 1974.
Wachter and Megbolugbe (1992) applied a modeling approach developed by Goodman (1988)
to the 1989 AHS. They included a large set of explanatory variables, including measures of the
relative costs of owning and renting; the expected appreciation in value of the occupied housing
units; permanent and transitory income; and measures of race, age, marital status, and gender of
the household head. They estimated separate models for African Americans and Whites and found
a 6-percentage-point lower rate of homeownership for African Americans than for Whites after
controlling for household endowments and related socioeconomic characteristics. This estimate
is distinctive in that it is lower than estimates in most previous studies using data from a roughly
similar time period. They also estimated separate models for Hispanics and non-Hispanics and
found that of a total difference in homeownership rates of 40 percentage points, only 9 percentage
points were unexplained by household attributes. Their approach differs from most other studies,
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however, by not accounting for the race of either Hispanics or non-Hispanics in their estimated
equations.
Myers and Chung (1996) focused on gaps in homeownership among preretirement White and
African-American households ages 51 to 62 using data from the HRS for 1992. A distinctive feature
of this data set is that it includes information about households’ tolerance for risk. The HRS also
provides controls for a large number of other household variables, including age, marital status,
gender, number of dependents, income, education, health, religion, region, and a measure of cognitive ability. Not included in the Myers and Chung (1996) study were data on household wealth,
mobility, expected house price appreciation, and income and job stability. Myers and Chung
(1996) found that having a longer planning horizon had a positive effect on homeownership while
risk-bearing preferences had no effect. Using the now-standard decomposition of the gap in homeownership, they found that the total 22.9 percentage point White–African-American gap was split
into a 13.6 percentage point endowment component and a 9.2 percentage point discrimination
and missing variables component.
Flippen (2001b) also used data from the 1992 HRS to study racial differences in homeownership
rates among Whites, African Americans, and Hispanics. She included data on inheritances, age,
marital status, number of children, health, cognitive ability, education, income, occupation,
self-employment, retirement status, number of prior layoffs, retirement status, expected years of
life remaining, region, urban location, risk tolerance, and length of planning period. This list is
the most comprehensive of all studies published through 2001 and it includes proxies for hardto-measure concepts such as income uncertainty and risk aversion. Even with all these controls,
Flippen found that African Americans and Hispanics were significantly less likely than Whites
were to be homeowners using the dummy variable approach. She then ran the equations separately
and decomposed the 25-percentage-point White–African-American gap in homeownership into
the part due to differences in endowments (24 percentage points) and the part due to the residual
(1 percentage point). Thus, the part of the gap due to discrimination or other omitted factors had
shrunk to a very small amount. Flippen then further decomposed the impact of endowments into
the effect of each explanatory variable by assessing the impact on the gap of substituting the mean
for Whites for a particular variable into the Black equation. Among the endowments, the contributions to the White-African-American gap in order of importance were marital status, income,
occupation, health, inheritances, and education. The gap in White-Hispanic homeownership was
27 percentage points, of which endowment differences explained 21 percentage points, leaving a
residual component of 6 percentage points. Differences in income and employment characteristics
were the most important endowment factors for Hispanics.
A number of studies have focused on explaining the White-Asian homeownership gap (Coulson,
1999; Painter, Gabriel, and Myers, 2001). Coulson (1999) used a national sample (the 1996 CPS)
to explain the disparity in White-Asian homeownership rates and found that all the differences in
ownership could be explained by differences in age, location in high-cost states, and immigrant
status. After all explanatory variables were controlled, Asians’ homeownership rate became greater
than that of Whites. Coulson and Kang (2001) and Painter, Yang, and Yu (2002) studied ethnic
groups with Asian origins. Coulson and Kang (2001) used CPS data from 1996 to 1999 and
defined five areas of origin for Asians: Japan, People’s Republic of China (PRC), Korea/Singapore/
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Hong Kong/Taiwan, Indian/Pakistan/ Bangladesh, and “other Asian.” Observed homeownerships
rates ranged from 39 to 63 percent. Explanatory variables in the homeownership estimation
included income, age, education, marital status, gender, number of children, location (central city
or suburban), ratio of owner house prices to rental rates, immigrant and citizenship status, and
years in the United States. This set of variables explained the homeownership gaps quite well.
Japanese, PRC, and “other” Asians experienced homeownership rates that were about 4 percentage
points higher than predicted. Homeownership rates were about 7 percentage points lower than
predicted for Asians from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh and about 3 percentage points lower
than predicted for Asians from Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
Painter, Yang, and Yu (2002) used the 5-percent sample of the 1990 decennial census microdata
and separated Asians into Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Asian Indian, and “other Asian”
groups. Their sample was drawn from three consolidated metropolitan areas: Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and New York. These three areas contained about half of all Asians in the United States
in 1990. Included as control variables in the researchers’ explanation of differences in homeownership rates were age, marital status, education, household size, permanent and transitory income,
house prices and rental rates, immigrant status, and duration of time in the United States.
Homeownership was estimated only for recent movers, creating the possibility of sample selection
bias. This problem was addressed by using the standard truncated bivariate model. One equation
modeled the move-stay decision and the other modeled the homeownership decision.
Using the decomposition method, the researchers found that ethnic Chinese were 18 to 23
percentage points more likely to be homeowners than Whites were, all other things being equal.
Asian Indians also were more likely to own than Whites were in all three locations, but the differences in homeownership rates were only 2 to 8 percentage points. Differences in homeownership
rates when comparing Filipinos and Koreans with Whites were small and when comparing “other
Asians” with Whites, the differences were 1 to 4 percentage points lower. Only Japanese in New
York had a substantially lower homeownership rate than comparable Whites. The researchers
argued that this difference was due to many Japanese in New York being students or business
employees on temporary assignments. The explanatory variables that were the most important
in explaining the gap depend on the particular group. Immigrant status is important, suggesting
that the White-Asian homeownership gaps may close in coming decades as the recent large wave
of immigrants is assimilated—although continued high rates of Asian immigration would serve to
maintain the observed homeownership gaps.
Studies That Estimate Trends in Homeownership Gaps. Long and Caudill (1992) estimated
a homeownership model using samples of married couples from the 1970 and 1980 decennial
censuses and the 1986 CPS to provide an assessment of trends in unexplained White–AfricanAmerican differences in homeownership. The results of their analysis suggest that race-related
residual differences in homeownership rates declined over the 16-year period. They noted the
1970 White–African-American gap was 20.8 percentage points and claimed that it fell to 14.3
percentage points in 1986. Their measure of the total gap is lower than that for all households
because of the restriction of their sample to married couples and, perhaps, because of the comparison of census data with CPS data. The researchers found that in 1970, 7.1 percentage points
of the gap was due to racial differences (discrimination and other omitted variables) and that this
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proportion of the gap fell to 2.6 percentage points by 1986. They concluded that, “housing market
discrimination which restricts the opportunities for Blacks to own homes is relatively unimportant
today, at least for Black households whose structure matches that of most White households (that
is, husband-and-wife households).”
Gyourko and Linneman (1997) compared changes in homeownership rates for African Americans
and other minorities between 1960 and 1990 to examine whether similarities occurred in the
experience of racial minorities in homeownership trends. Using census data, the researchers
showed that aggregate homeownership rates among non-African-American minorities increased
by about the same amount as that of African-American households between 1960 and 1970 and
between 1980 and 1990. Between 1970 and 1980, however, homeownership rates among African
Americans increased by 3.2 percentage points, but, among other minorities, homeownership declined by 0.6 percentage points. The divergence of rates in the 1970s is due to multiple factors, but
an important one is the difference in the composition of minorities in terms of share of natives and
immigrants. In particular, the rate of immigration of non-African-American minorities was substantially larger than that of African Americans. Because recent immigrants tend to have relatively low
homeownership rates, this difference in part explains the divergence in rates.
Gyourko, Linneman, and Wachter (1999) also examined changes over time in the effect of minority status on homeownership rates using the SCF (1962, 1977, and 1983 surveys).32 They reported
results for the typical White household and measured the impact of race by the change in the
predicted probability of owning when race was changed to non-White. Results were reported for
two different household types: wealth constrained and unconstrained. Among households without
wealth constraints, minorities have a slightly higher predicted homeownership rate (holding
other variables constant) than Whites do. For wealth-constrained households, the shortfall in
homeownership due to race dropped sharply, from 25 to 6 percentage points, between 1962 and
1977 and then rose to 12 percentage points in 1983. A limitation of the study is that all minorities
are grouped together, which confounds efforts to interpret the findings. A change occurring from
1962 to 1983 in the composition of the minority population could account for the variation in
estimates from the different years. For example, African Americans far outnumbered other minority
groups in 1962, but, by 1983, the Hispanic and Asian population had grown considerably and
included substantial numbers of recent immigrants. Gyourko, Linneman, and Wachter (1999)
concluded that, because little racial difference occurred in the likelihood of homeownership among
households not subject to a wealth constraint, discrimination was not an important explanation
for racial differences in homeownership after differences in endowments were taken into account.
Instead, they contended that racial differences in homeownership were largely due to differences in
wealth. An important concern about this study, however, is that the researchers treated wealth as
exogenous even though the desire for homeownership has the potential to affect a household’s level
of wealth.
Bostic and Surette (2001) studied changes in homeownership among Whites, African Americans,
and Hispanics between 1989 and 1998, when the U.S. average homeownership rate grew by 2.3
percentage points, or 8 million households. Using CPS data, they focused on household heads ages
22 to 60 and separated into five income categories. In 1989, the observed White–African-American
gap was 28.8 percentage points, falling 2.0 percentage points by 1998. Over the same period, the
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gap in the Hispanic homeownership rate fell by 1 percentage point. Bostic and Surette (2001)
argued that the changes in the homeownership rate and the gaps could be due to one of three
general factors: changes in household socioeconomic characteristics; changes in the regulatory
environment (for example, the Community Reinvestment Act, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, or
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac); or technological developments, such as credit scoring. In 1989, the component
of the White–African-American gap not attributable to the explanatory variables ranged from 9.8
to 16.9 percentage points, depending on the income quintile. These gaps fell over the next decade
by –0.6 to 6.0 percentage points; the reduction averaged 3.1 percentage points, somewhat larger
than the change in the observed total gap. The comparable results for Hispanics were –0.1- to 4.4percentage-point reductions in the gaps, averaging 2.1 percentage points. No clear pattern emerged
of the size of the reduction in this residual gap across different income categories.
Collins and Margo (2001) studied changes in the homeownership gap between African-American
and White male household heads ages 20 to 64 during the 20th century. For their data set, the
gap decreased from 24.3 to 21.9 percentage points between 1900 and 1940. It then jumped to
27.3 percentage points in 1960, and subsequently fell to 19.6 percentage points in 1980, where it
remained stable through 1990. The researchers used an OLS model, estimated separately for each
census year, to explain homeownership with the following explanatory variables included in the
model: African American; occupational status; age; literacy; geographic location (farm, urban, or
suburban areas); region; marital status; household size; whether the household includes more than
one family; native-born interregional migrants; and foreign-born status. Many sensible explanatory
variables were omitted because of the limitations created by using census data, especially that from
the early 1900s. The coefficient of the African-American indictor variable declined fairly steadily
from 1900 to 1990, implying that unexplained factors causing the gap decreased in importance
over time. This insight is relatively powerful because Collins and Margo (2001) included the same
list of explanatory variables in every census year regression. Their analysis suggests that the cause
of the increase in the gap between 1940 and 1960 was mostly due to a change in the levels of
the explanatory variables, particularly the level of urbanization of African Americans (suggesting
the importance of supply-side effects). The rest of the change was due to changes in behavioral
responses to the explanatory variables, particularly education. After 1960, only 40 percent of the
reduction in the gap was explained by changes in endowments or behavioral responses; thus, the
majority of the reduction was due to unmeasured factors. The researchers noted that this finding
is consistent with fair housing policies having had a positive impact on homeownership rates for
African Americans.
Multiple limitations of the Collins and Margo (2001) study exist. First, the elimination of femaleheaded households from the sample, combined with the increase in the percentage of households
that are female headed over time, masks substantial changes in the homeownership rate. Clearly,
the overall homeownership rate was pulled down after 1960 by the increase in the percentage of
households that are headed by single females. The analysis was limited to households under age
65, a restriction that likely reduced the size of the gap because of the high homeownership rate
of household heads age 65 or older and the longer average lifespan of Whites. Finally, the list of
variables omitted from the analysis is large.
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Another study focusing on the same wide sweep of time is Masnick (2001). The researcher
included all households in the analysis, not just male household heads ages 20 to 64, he found
different trends during the 20th century than Collins and Margo(2001) did, most importantly a
much larger gap in 1980 and 1990. Masnick’s (2001) most important contribution is noting the
durability of the White–African-American gap for an age-specific cohort as the member’s age. For
example, if the gap was particularly small for a cohort ages 20 to 29 in year t, then the gap tends
to remain small in years t + 10, t + 20, and so on. At any point in time, the total observed gap for a
racial group is the weighted average of current age cohorts’ gaps. Thus, given the tendency of gaps
for specific cohorts to continue over time, trends in homeownership rates and gaps depend on the
gaps of the cohorts that are “exiting” the population and those that are entering the population.
Although research on the sustainability of homeownership is in its infancy, it is plausible that
cohort-specific gaps persist over time because current homeownership tends to increase the likelihood of future homeownership. The implication is that if, for example, a public policy is implemented that increases the homeownership rate of young African-American households compared
with that of White households, then this policy may impact the homeownership gap not only
during the implementation period but also throughout these individuals’ lifetimes. Furthermore,
and more speculatively, if intergenerational transmission of tendencies to become a homeowner
occurs, the impact of the public policy could be transmitted from one age cohort to its children.33
Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005) used data from the SCF to identify the factors associated with
homeownership trends by race and ethnicity between 1983 and 2001. Their models controlled for
household demographic characteristics and geographic location and also incorporated information
on whether a household was constrained in its access to credit. The researchers found that roughly
half of the average gap in Hispanic homeownership over the period they studied was explained by
available variables (14 percentage points out of a total gap of 30 percentage points). The remaining
portion of the gap is attributable to factors not captured in their models, including immigrant
status and discriminatory treatment. Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005) also examined White–AfricanAmerican gaps in homeownership rates but found that the included variables in their models
explained a much larger share of the observed differences compared with gaps in Hispanic homeownership rates. On average, the included variables accounted for 19 percentage points of the total
gap of 26 percentage points. The larger unexplained Hispanic gap may well reflect the barriers
faced by the large share of immigrants among Hispanics. Credit barriers account for no more than
5 percentage points of the remaining gap. This observation suggests that policymakers will need to
look beyond innovations in mortgage finance if their goal is to further expand homeownership.

Summary
Homeownership rates are, by definition, equal to the number of owner-occupier households in
the population divided by the total number of households present. Thus, the propensity to form a
household could contribute to income-related and racial- and ethnic-related gaps in homeownership rates, but in a complicated manner. For example, we know that African-American marital
rates are far lower than White marital rates. That difference serves to increase the number of
African-American households relative to White households. But, because single-headed households
are typically more likely to rent than married households are, lower African-American marriage
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rates likely have a less-than-proportionate impact on the number of African-American homeowner
families. Because African-American marital status likely increases the numerator in the homeownership rate calculation by less than the denominator, the influence of marital status on household
formation likely lowers African-American homeownership rates relative to those of Whites. More
generally, our knowledge of the influence of household formation on homeownership gaps is in its
infancy and requires further study.
Once a household is formed, what drives the decision to own versus rent a home? As a broad characterization, two conditions must be met in order for a household to become an owner occupier.
The household must want to own its home, given its current financial and social status, and the
household must be able to own a home. Because housing is a durable asset, demand for homeownership is sensitive to investment considerations and, therefore, is subject to all the considerations
and factors that influence a household’s preferred portfolio. In that regard, households sensitive
to financial risk, such as low-income households, are less likely to want to own a home, all other
things being equal. In addition, the return on homeownership is especially sensitive to household
mobility, given the very high transaction costs of selling an owner-occupied home compared with
moving from a rental unit. Evidence reported in this article suggests that among renters, lower income households are more mobile. This observation further implies that lower income households
will be less likely to want to own their homes. Additionally, the federal tax code provides generous
subsidies to homeowners by failing to tax imputed rent and allowing deductions for mortgage
interest and property tax payments. Nevertheless, the benefits from such favorable tax treatment
accrue disproportionately to higher income households with higher marginal income tax rates and
a greater propensity to itemize. The tax code, too, therefore, contributes to higher homeownership
rates among high-income households than lower income households. Because minorities typically
have lower income than Whites do, these considerations contribute to racial and ethnic gaps in
homeownership rates as well.
On the other hand, credible arguments and evidence in the literature suggest that constraints
beyond the control of individual households may restrict access to homeownership for some
households. Such “supply” constraints could arise in two different but related markets. First, in
the housing market, a small number of studies have suggested that single-family housing is more
conducive to homeownership. This link could arise because of preferences for such housing
among prospective homebuyers; single-family housing and homeownership could be viewed by
households as complementary goods. In addition, single-family housing does not typically entail
common property issues. In contrast, in a multifamily building, the management of common
space and controls for noise and the like create administrative costs when organizing the units into
condominiums suitable for homeownership. For these reasons, access to single-family housing may
foster homeownership.
We note that minorities of all income levels are more likely to live in high-density, central-city
housing than comparable White households are. Obviously a correlation of spatial location and
homeownership rates exists and the above argument suggests there could be a causal relationship.
If causality exists, then to the extent that discrimination and related segregation in the housing
market restricts minority access to single-family neighborhoods, segregation contributes to racial
and ethnic gaps in homeownership. Further study of this issue is needed.
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Restricted access to mortgage credit is a second explanation for why some households ready to
become homeowners remain renters. Because minorities often have lower income and wealth
and less secure employment, they may be subject to statistical discrimination in loan markets
to the extent that lenders use race and ethnicity as predictors of hard-to-observe risk attributes.
Such behavior is illegal in the mortgage market. Nevertheless, a number of studies have provided
evidence of discrimination in mortgage markets. Beginning in the early 1990s, a variety of very
low-downpayment mortgage products developed partly in response to concerns about minority
access to mortgage credit became available through conventional lenders. The particular problem
targeted was the very low level of wealth among minority renters. Minority households that rent,
however, may rationally prefer to rent rather than subject themselves to the financial risks that
accompany homeownership, even if homeownership is obtainable with a low-downpayment loan.
Thus, contrary to the beliefs of the early 1990s, very low-downpayment loans may not close the
homeownership gap.
Initial studies of the gap in homeownership focused on White–African-American differences; the
analysis later was expanded to include Hispanic and Asian homeownership gaps. These early
researchers assumed that the factors influencing households to become homeowners were the same
for African Americans and Whites and that both groups’ behavioral responses to these factors were
the same. The studies separated the gap into two components: one due to differences in endowments and the other due to an unexplained residual amount. The magnitude of the residual shortfall in the probability of homeownership attributed to race rather than endowments has ranged
over samples from about 5 to 20 percentage points. In general, a downward trend has occurred
in the unexplained portion of homeownership rate differences over time. This trend could have
occurred because recent studies have used a more comprehensive set of socioeconomic explanatory
variables as the quality of data sets improved. Another explanation for the trend is a smaller impact
of discrimination (which is very difficult to observe directly) in the mortgage and housing markets.
This reduction of the residual also is consistent with the establishment over time of a number of
policies that monitor mortgage markets and brokerage services and enforce fair housing laws. To
date, most studies that have noted a decline in the residual component of the homeownership gap
have attributed this change to reduced discrimination. It is clear to us, however, that researchers
are now including more and better explanatory variables in their analyses. Nevertheless, some
recent studies fully explain the gap in homeownership, suggesting that the effect of discrimination
in the housing and mortgage markets on the homeownership rate is now minimal.

Conclusions and Topics in Need of Further Research
Two broad but compelling conclusions emerge from our review of the literature of income-, racial-,
and ethnic-related homeownership gaps. First, additional efforts targeting discrimination in housing and mortgage markets or targeting renters’ lack of information about the homebuying process
are very unlikely to narrow racial gaps in homeownership by more than 10 percentage points. This
conclusion implies that future efforts to narrow aggregate White-minority gaps should primarily
focus on addressing the differences in household circumstances by race and ethnicity—including
wealth, income, and marital status—that account for a large majority of observed differences in
homeownership rates. Some of these factors can be addressed by efforts to reduce barriers to
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homeownership associated with income and wealth (such as below-market interest rate mortgages
or low-downpayment programs). Nevertheless, the fact that so much of the homeownership gap is
attributable to the generally lower socioeconomic standing of minorities suggests that policies that
address broader societal factors will also be needed to close these gaps over time. The factors that
are important to supporting homeownership, but may fall outside the range of homeownership
policies, include enhanced job opportunities, job security, and household stability. Creating an
environment conducive to financial and family security for minorities is a challenging task but is
one that policymakers must grapple with if they are to substantially reduce current racial gaps in
homeownership.
A second conclusion from this review is that considerable opportunities are present for further
research to expand our knowledge of the determinants of race- and income-related gaps in
homeownership. For example, although the stability of household income is understood to be
an important determinant of homeownership, very little research has focused on the manner and
extent to which employment and income stability affect both the demand for homeownership and
the constraints imposed on low-income and minority households. Studies in this area are needed
to understand the extent to which some households rationally choose to rent when faced with an
unstable flow of future income.
As the conceptual framework makes clear, the demand for homeownership is strongly influenced
by the investment demand for housing. Although this trend is well understood, there is a shortage
of literature that examines how the investment returns from housing vary by income and race.
For example, a household’s expected length of stay will have a significant effect on the investment
return from homeownership. Nevertheless, although many studies of household mobility exist, few
link differences in expected mobility by race and income to gaps in homeownership rates.
Variations in investment return by race may also contribute to racial gaps in homeownership rates.
If house values increase less for homes owned by minority households than for homes owned by
White households, then the expected return from owning is reduced along with the propensity for
homeownership. These concerns can arise when preferences for neighborhood racial composition
give rise to tipping effects whereby in-movement of a discriminated group (for example, African
Americans) prompts an exodus from the neighborhood (for example, White flight), thereby
reducing property values. Patterns of racial segregation may also limit housing appreciation in
minority neighborhoods if few Whites seek to buy homes in these areas. In contrast, if minorities
face a limited spatial choice set for residential location and if an influx of minority households
to predominantly minority neighborhoods occurs, then house price appreciation rates could be
relatively high. Research is needed to investigate the national picture of house price appreciation
rates by income, race, and ethnicity and the role that these factors may play in reducing minority
homeownership.
House price volatility is an important source of risk in homeownership. Few studies that we are
aware of, however, assess the intertemporal variance of the price of low-priced homes and houses
in areas primarily populated by minorities. Further study is needed to identify the degree of risk to
which low-income households are exposed when they purchase low-priced homes.
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Another issue that may differentially affect the financial risk and returns to homeownership for
low-income households is the cost of home maintenance. It is well known that older housing is
subject to higher levels of maintenance costs on average and also a greater risk of potentially very
high maintenance expenses; however, it is not known whether these factors contribute to incomeand race-related gaps in homeownership.
Also, although the impact of favorable tax treatment of homeownership on overall homeownership
rates has been studied, the impact of favorable tax treatment on racial gaps in homeownership
rates is in need of further study. The tax code is obviously a policy tool and its impact on the gap
should be accounted for when modifications to tax laws are considered.
In general, studies of household decisions to own a home tend to be based on more advanced
models than those of gaps in homeownership rates. For example, current theoretical and empirical
models of household decisions to own a home often adopt an intertemporal optimization framework that recognizes the long-term nature of homeownership decisions. Further work is needed to
adapt similar models to studies of gaps in homeownership rates.
Along these same lines, although the literature on household decisions to own a home recognizes
that a household’s current tenure status affects its future housing tenure choices, little recognition
of this fact exists in the homeownership gaps literature. One consequence of the importance of past
homeownership attainment on future tenure choices is that cohort-specific gaps appear to persist
over time. This observation is important for housing policy because programs that increase the
homeownership rate of young low-income and minority households may have long-term effects
throughout these individuals’ lifetimes. Nevertheless, research on this topic is basically nonexistent.
Another intertemporal aspect of tenure choice suggested by several studies is the hypothesis that
that intergenerational transmission of the tendency to become a homeowner occurs. Aside from the
obvious transmission of wealth across generations, another possible motivation for such phenomena would be intergenerational transmission of information about both the benefits of homeownership and how to navigate the real estate brokerage and mortgage markets. If this hypothesis is
true, policies that close the White-minority homeownership gap may have a long-term effect by
boosting the homeownership rate of the next generation of minorities. Hard evidence related to
this idea is scant and implies the need for further study.
On the supply side, a fair amount of research has investigated the impact of mortgage finance
barriers on homeownership; however, relatively little research has examined the impact of spatial
limits on access to affordable and attractive homeownership options on low-income and minority
homeownership rates. In the early 1970s, one study argued that racial segregation in conjunction
with high-density, central-city housing restricted homeownership opportunities for minorities.
Little attention has been given to this issue since it was first proposed, despite the fact that residential segregation by race is still quite high in many areas. A related deficiency in the literature is the
absence of any study that carefully documents the administrative costs associated with organizing
multifamily buildings into condominiums. Are these costs higher if the tenants have low incomes?
Are they higher in localities with high crime rates or highly mobile households? How do these
costs vary with the type of building and neighborhood? These issues have never been carefully
researched but warrant further attention.
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Another important supply-side question is the role of manufactured homes as an affordable
homeownership option. Units of this type constitute a large (8.2 percent) and growing share of the
nation’s owner-occupied housing stock and this sector has been one of the keys to homeownership
growth in the 1990s. This growth in ownership of manufactured housing has been particularly
strong for low-income and African-American households. This observation suggests that manufactured
housing has a substantial role to play in explaining and helping to close homeownership gaps by
race and ethnicity, particularly if financing issues for manufactured housing are addressed. Further
study is needed of the profiles of new owners of manufactured homes, the duration of ownership
of manufactured housing, and the factors that explain the differences in the likelihood of owning
manufactured housing analyzed among different income groups and racial and ethnic groups.
Finally, an important omission in the literature is the very limited amount of research that has
sought to evaluate the effectiveness of specific homeownership policies. Policymakers therefore
should consider including evaluation efforts as part of homeownership programs. The emphasis
in policy circles on efforts to address wealth constraints and on education and counseling further
highlights the two areas in which evaluative research would be most beneficial.
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Notes
1.

A review of homeownership gaps that focuses on Hispanics is Cortes et al. (2006).

2.

For example, a two-family home (duplex) occupied by the owner in one unit and a renter in
the other has one owned unit and one rental unit.

3.

Haurin, Hendershott, and Kim (1993) distinguished potential earnings from actual earnings
because a youth’s actual earnings depend on labor supply, a choice variable influenced by the
living arrangement that is selected.
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4.

Differences among groups in the average age of homeleaving also affect both the headship
rate of the group and the propensity for homeownership. Earlier homeleaving by youths,
for example, likely implies more renters, depressing the group’s ownership rate. Earlier
homeleaving may also lead to a higher incidence of grouping up, which would mitigate the
impact of early homeleaving on the number of households associated with a given portion of
the population.

5.

Data compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Beck and Harrison 2001) indicates that
the rate of incarceration (in federal and state prisons) per 100,000 people increased by 77
percent from 1990 to 2000 and it is much higher for African-American males compared with
White and Hispanic males. The rate of incarceration approaches 10 percent of the AfricanAmerican male population for those ages 25 to 29.

6.

“Imputed rent” is the market value of the housing services consumed by the owner occupier.
It is imputed because the owner does not make any explicit payments for these services.

7.

Hoyt and Rosenthal (1992) assumed that all owner occupiers itemize and take advantage
of deductions for mortgage interest and property tax payments. Follain and Ling (1991),
however, showed that many owner occupiers do not itemize but instead take the standard
deduction. For these households, owner-occupied housing is less heavily subsidized than
the estimate reported previously would suggest but likely is still less expensive than rental
housing because of the failure to tax imputed rent.

8.

Studies by Case and Shiller (1989), Meese and Wallace (1994), and Rosenthal (1999) all
found evidence consistent with the idea that over a short time horizon the possibility for
arbitrage opportunities may exist in real estate markets but over a longer time horizon such
opportunities appear to disappear.

9.

Prior to 1986, homeowner capital gains were taxed at a rate equal to 40 percent of the
family’s marginal income tax rate. Nevertheless, filers were allowed a one-time exemption
from capital gains tax if they were older than 55. After 1986, homeowner capital gains were
taxed at a rate equal to the family’s marginal income tax rate but marginal income tax rates
were also lowered. The net effect, however, was a substantial increase in the typical tax rate
on homeowner capital gains (see Hoyt and Rosenthal [1992]). Finally, beginning in 1998, the
U.S. government effectively did away with the capital gains tax on homeowners of all ages for
gains up to $250,000 for single filers and $500,000 for married couples filing joint returns.

10. A number of studies have also assumed various values for the transaction costs of owners,
including Goodman (1995)—5 to 10 percent of current income; Cunningham and
Hendershott (1984)—12 percent of house value; and Rosenthal (1988)—7 percent of future
house value, discounted to the present. Malatesta and Hess (1986) used a small sample to
estimate that the average transaction cost of a relocating homeowner equals about 12 percent
of house value. Haurin and Gill (2002) used a sample of military members and found that
the transaction cost of selling a home is the sum of 3 percent of house value and 4 percent of
household earnings. In addition, Shelton (1968) suggested that because of these transaction
costs homeownership should be avoided if a household’s planned length of stay in a dwelling
is less than 3.5 years.
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11. A graphical presentation of this model is contained in Herbert et al. (2005) and a
mathematical model and the resulting predictions are described in appendix A. A test of the
model is contained in Ioannides and Rosenthal (1994).
12. This differs from Arrondel and Lefebvre (2001), who found little difference in the
determinants of the housing investment and consumption demand functions for France.
13. African-American households tend to use the conventional mortgage market less than White
households do: more use of “rent to own” and seller financing occurs in African-American
than in White households. Thus, although we know of no studies that quantify this claim,
it is possible that that the amount of formal mortgage interest paid by African-American
households is lower than that paid by Whites, all other things being equal. The implication is
that African Americans’ tax advantage is lower than that of Whites, explaining part of the gap
in ownership.
14. These estimates were obtained using data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances and
were derived from a model that also controls for a host of household attributes as well as the
influence of credit constraints and the density of development in the neighborhood.
15. Low wealth among immigrant Hispanics also is affected by large remittance flows to relatives
living in the immigrants’ home country. For example, remittances to Central America
doubled from $1.8 billion in 1996 to $3.6 billion in 2001 compared with an estimated $2.0
billion in foreign direct investment and $2.1 billion in official development assistance in
2001 (Inter-American Dialogue, 2004).
16. See appendix B in Herbert et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion of this model.
17. For a discussion of related issues in the subprime mortgage market, see Bunce et al. (2001).
18. Since 2004, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data reported by lenders has
identified high-cost loans as first-lien loans that were originated with interest rates more than
3 percentage points above the rate on Treasury bonds with a comparable term. This highcost indicator has become the predominant means of identifying subprime mortgages in the
HMDA data.
19. For example, Neighborhood Advantage Zero DownTM is an affordable mortgage product
offered by Bank of America, N.A. In 1998, it was available in 23 states and the District of
Columbia. Neighborhood Advantage Zero DownTM is a conventional mortgage that requires
no downpayment. In addition, closing costs can be paid for by a gift or by the seller or can be
financed (Bank of America, 1998).
20. In addition, if an offsetting decline in wealth held by minority households in the 1990s
occurred, the impact of new low-downpayment loans would be reduced. This scenario seems
unlikely given the strong economy. A more realistic issue is that higher loan-to-value ratios
imply higher monthly mortgage payments and, thus, higher house-payment-to-income
ratios. Although lender standards on such ratios also were relaxed somewhat in the 1990s,
for many families, low-downpayment loans could imply debt service ratios that would be
unappealing.
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21. Evidence that discrimination exists in the housing market that restricts minorities’ choices is
contained in fair housing audit studies (Yinger, 1986).
22. More generally, employment can occur anywhere in the metropolitan area, but the principle
still holds that in competitive markets land prices adjust to compensate for differential
proximity to employment centers.
23. Wheaton (1977) was the first to argue that the two effects identified by Muth (1969) offset
each other and thus other factors determine locational choice.
24. Detailed tables are presented in Herbert et al. (2005).
25. Although the issue of homeownership differences across the income distribution also
is an important issue, income has not been the primary focus of most work evaluating
homeownership differences. As a result, this section primarily deals with the large amount
of literature that has analyzed the causes of gaps in homeownership by race. Nonetheless,
income is always one of the factors controlled for in these studies.
26. More specifically, the decomposition process entails applying the estimated coefficients
predicting White homeownership to the characteristics of African-American households.
The average predicted probability of homeownership for all African-American households
provides an estimate of the African-American homeownership rate assuming AfricanAmerican choices were made in the same way as White choices. Subtracting this estimated
African-American homeownership rate from the overall White homeownership rate provides
an estimate of the ”endowment” effect; that is, the difference in rates due to differences in
household characteristics or endowments. The “residual effect” is the remaining difference
between the actual African-American homeownership rate and the overall African-American
homeownership rate predicted using the White model. Also see appendix C in Herbert et al.
(2005).
27. Substituting permanent for current income caused that racial gap to jump to 19.4 percentage
points.
28. A number of studies of homeownership conducted during the 1970s examined tenure
decisions of recent movers to account for the lag between a decision to change tenure and
the time when the change actually occurs given the high transaction costs associated with
purchasing or selling a home. Kain and Quigley (1972), Ladenson (1978), and Silberman,
Yochum, and Ihlanfeldt (1982) examined the tenure choice of recent movers. It was assumed
that recent movers more accurately reflected a household’s optimal tenure choice, which
was thought to be particularly important during a period when there were rapid changes in
legal protections for minorities and prejudicial attitudes. In recent years it has become less
common to focus only on recent movers, with the implicit assumption being that on average
the temporary disequilibrium between a household’s current and desired tenure does not bias
overall findings about the factors determining tenure choice.
29. Cortes et al. (2006), in a recent report, thoroughly reviewed the differential ownership rates
of Hispanics by country of origin. They noted that in 2000 the ownership rates varied from

42 Low-Income and Minority Homeownership

Homeownership Gaps Among Low-Income and Minority Households

60 percent for Spaniards to 58 percent for Cubans, 34 percent for Puerto Ricans, and 20
percent for Dominicans.
30. There continues to be evidence of incidents of discrimination in both the rental and homeownership markets (Ross and Yinger, 2002). Also, even when faced with discrimination in
the real estate or mortgage market, a minority household could continue to search, eventually
finding a nondiscriminatory agent or lender.
31. The researchers had access to a data set that included credit scores and a variety of household
characteristics. Using these data, they developed a statistical model to predict a credit score
using household characteristics that were available in the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), including detailed information on assets and liabilities; use of financial services;
income; housing status (renter and homeowner); and demographic characteristics (age,
years of education, marital status, number of dependents, and race and ethnicity). They
then applied the estimated model to SCF data in each of the 4 years. The cutoff of scores
below 660 to represent those who are credit constrained is based on the authors’ review
of information on the use of credit scores by mortgage lenders as reported by Fair Isaac
Corporation at www.ficoguide.com.
32. This study is an extension of work by Linneman and Wachter (1989) that examined the
importance of borrowing constraints in determining homeownership.
33. For supportive empirical evidence see Boehm and Schlottmann (1999).
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